Behind the Curtain: The Within-Household Sharing of Income by Susanne Elsas
Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung
www.diw.de
Susanne Elsas  
E
Behind the Curtain:    
The Within-Household Sharing of Income
382
SOEPpapers
on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research
Berlin, June 2011SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research  
at DIW Berlin 
 
This series presents research findings based either directly on data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP) or using SOEP data as part of an internationally comparable 
data set (e.g. CNEF, ECHP, LIS, LWS, CHER/PACO). SOEP is a truly multidisciplinary 
household panel study covering a wide range of social and behavioral sciences: economics, 
sociology, psychology, survey methodology, econometrics and applied statistics, educational 
science, political science, public health, behavioral genetics, demography, geography, and 
sport science.   
 
The decision to publish a submission in SOEPpapers is made by a board of editors chosen 
by the DIW Berlin to represent the wide range of disciplines covered by SOEP. There is no 
external referee process and papers are either accepted or rejected without revision. Papers 
appear in this series as works in progress and may also appear elsewhere. They often 
represent preliminary studies and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a 
paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be requested from 
the author directly. 
 
Any opinions expressed in this series are those of the author(s) and not those of DIW Berlin. 
Research disseminated by DIW Berlin may include views on public policy issues, but the 
institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 




Georg Meran (Dean DIW Graduate Center) 
Gert G. Wagner (Social Sciences) 
Joachim R. Frick (Empirical Economics) 
Jürgen Schupp (Sociology) 
Conchita D’Ambrosio (Public Economics)  
Christoph Breuer (Sport Science, DIW Research Professor)  
Elke Holst (Gender Studies) 
Martin Kroh (Political Science and Survey Methodology) 
Frieder R. Lang (Psychology, DIW Research Professor) 
Jörg-Peter Schräpler (Survey Methodology, DIW Research Professor) 
C. Katharina Spieß (Educational Science) 
Martin Spieß (Survey Methodology, DIW Research Professor) 
 
ISSN: 1864-6689 (online) 
 
 
German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) 
DIW Berlin 
Mohrenstrasse 58 
10117 Berlin, Germany 
 
Contact: Uta Rahmann |  soeppapers@diw.de  Behind the Curtain:




The distribution of personal income in a society depends strongly on
the within-household distribution of income. Nevertheless, little is known
about this phenomenon. I analyze the sharing of income among household
partners from a welfare economic perspective. Measures of ﬁnancial satis-
faction for both household partners are used to gain information about the
within-household distribution of income-induced well-being. A model of
satisfaction diﬀerences between household partners is developed and esti-
mated using 10 waves (1999 to 2008) of the German Socio-Economic Panel
Study. Diﬀerences in ﬁnancial satisfaction within couples are generally
small. However, satisfaction is not a direct measure of welfare. For this
reason, covariates are included to control for the partners’ diﬀerent charac-
teristics, inﬂuencing the expression of satisfaction. Using panel data allows
us to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the household level, which
is one major advancement of this analysis.
The results show that the partners’ relative earned income has a sub-
stantial eﬀect on the distribution of income-induced well-being, whereas
the relative amount of transfer income does not.
Keywords: income pooling, personal income, welfare, family, subjective well-being
JEL Classiﬁcation: D31, I32
11 Introduction
The problem with analyses of the distribution of personal income is that house-
holds are the unit of observation while individuals are the unit of analysis. To
solve this problem, researchers typically calculate for each individual the equiva-
lent income representing the amount of money this person would need to achieve
the same level of welfare if he or she lived alone. A crucial assumption for these
calculations is the equal sharing assumption, which supposes that all members of
a household achieve the same level of welfare from the household income1. Al-
though the equal sharing assumption may be the best possible assumption avail-
able, several researchers have shown that it is not supported by empirical data
(cf. Thomas, 1993; Browning et al., 1994; Lundberg and Pollak, 1996; Phipps
and Burton, 1998; Pahl, 1989). It rather seems that sharing resources within
households is not independent of the household members’ characteristics, such as
age, education or earned income. The results obtained from very diﬀerent ap-
proaches are consistent in that the equal sharing assumption is not maintainable.
In addition, the results are inconsistent with regard to the distribution factors
that determine sharing within households. Whatever determines sharing within
households, the within-household distribution of income has a strong inﬂuence
on the distribution of personal income in a society and thereby, for example, on
the extent and, even more considerably the structure of poverty (cf. Phipps and
Burton, 1995).
As individuals’ needs diﬀer, it is not the distribution of money itself that is
of theoretical importance, but the distribution of income-induced well-being. We
will therefor speak of equal sharing if members of one household achieve the same
level of well-being from the use of the household income.
Equal sharing implies that sharing is independent of any factor that itself
does not inﬂuence the household members’ preferences. The implication of equal
sharing is used to rephrase the assumption into a hypothesis: partners share
their income equally, i.e. independently. The hypothesis can be rejected if any
factor is found to inﬂuence the within-household sharing of income. According to
Browning et al. (1994), such factors will be called distribution factors. Beyond
1This is also called the income pooling hypothesis. With the focus on income distribution,
the expression "equal sharing assumption", used for example by Hauser (2002); Jenkins (1991);
Phipps and Burton (1995) is more lucid.
2testing the equal sharing hypothesis, insights are gained into the procedures of
sharing between household partners.
A major challenge in analyzing the within-household sharing of income is its
unobservability. This problem can be treated in diﬀerent ways, e.g. analyzing the
demand for assignable goods (cf. Browning et al., 1994), the access to and type
of usage of (shared) bank accounts (Woolley, 2000), the diﬀerences in amounts of
spending money between partners (Ludwig-Mayerhofer et al., 2006), the within-
household diﬀerences in the self-reported economic position on a ﬁve-step ladder
(Kalugina et al., 2009) or diﬀerences in ﬁnancial satisfaction between household
partners (Bonke and Browning, 2009).
In this paper, the latter approach is used to analyze the distribution of income
between household partners. Note again that it is well-being from income that
is of interest here, not money itself. In line with Van Praag and Frijters (1999,
p.427), "the contribution to our well-being from those goods and services that we
can buy with money" will be called welfare. For the following empirical analysis
ﬁnancial satisfaction is used to identify welfare. However, satisfaction is not an
exact measure of welfare. It is well known that individual attributes such as
age, education and psychological characteristics inﬂuence reported satisfaction.
Diﬀerences in individual ﬁnancial satisfaction are to some extent the result of
diﬀerences in individual characteristics, independent of the presence of household
partners and independent of the fact that household income has to be shared. In
contrast to Bonke and Browning (2009) and Kalugina et al. (2009), the household
members’ diﬀerences in such characteristics, inﬂuencing satisfaction statements,
are systematically taken into account. It is the residual diﬀerence in ﬁnancial
satisfaction that may be explained with diﬀerent shares of the household income
that are used to contribute to partners’ well-being.
In order to analyze the distribution of income among household partners,
longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) of the
years 1999 to 2008 are to be used. This allows us to control for household-
speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity, such as the constellation of personalities living
together in one household. For the analysis at hand, the income shares received
by children are disregarded; likewise, the well-being from household production
and non-monetary income is ignored.
First, the theoretical model to identify the distribution of income among part-
ners will be derived (Section 2). To this end, relations between reported ﬁnancial
satisfaction, distribution of income among household members, distribution of
3power in the household and individual attributes determining bargaining power
are used. A brief description of the data is then provided (Section 3), before pre-
senting the estimation results in Section 4. The article closes with an illustration
of the results’ possible scope in Section 5 and some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical approach
Assuming that income induces material well-being and that this welfare is ex-
pressed in ﬁnancial satisfaction, reported ﬁnancial satisfaction may be used to
analyze the distribution of income within households.
To follow this path, assumptions on two linkages need to be made. The ﬁrst
link is that between income and welfare, and the necessary assumptions are part
of standard micro-economic theory: Individuals must be equally able to transform
income into well-being; individuals must be subject to the same prices, and need
to be equally informed. This is unlikely to be the case in society as a whole,
but these are reasonable assumptions for partners in one household. It is not
necessary to assume that partners need the same amount of money to produce
the same level of well-being, i.e. common or identical utility function, because it
is not the distribution of amounts of money that is of interest, but the distribution
of income-induced well-being among the partners.
Second, assumptions need to be made on the linkage between income-induced
well-being and ﬁnancial satisfaction for the analysis at hand. Financial satisfac-
tion depends on several individual characteristics, such as age, education, gender,
individual psychological attributes, labor market status (cf. Van Praag and Ferrer-
i-Carbonell, 2004) and somehow on income-induced well-being, i.e. welfare. It
seems reasonable to assume that welfare depends on actual welfare-eﬀective in-
come, i.e. equivalent income, rather than on total household income (cf. Schwarze,
2003).
In the context of this analysis, the welfare-eﬀective income is assumed to be
the amount of income this person would need to achieve the same level of welfare
if she or he lived alone. Now, let this welfare-eﬀective income ˜ yih of person i in
household h be a function g(.) of the household’s total income yh:





m the male partner of a household, and
f the female partner of a household.
As usual, economies of scale of living together are assumed:
˜ ymh + ˜ yfh > yh (2)
Actual welfare-eﬀective income ˜ yih will aﬀect ﬁnancial satisfaction, specially
if it is compared to expected welfare-eﬀective income. The expected welfare-
eﬀective income is assumed to be the level of welfare a partner expects, expressed
in amounts of money that he or she would need - when living alone - to achieve
this level. According to the idea of adaptation (Stutzer, 2004), I assume that
expectations about welfare levels are tailored towards the household’s scope, i.e.
expected welfare eﬀective income y∗




ih = f(yh). (3)
Stutzer (2004) showed that an individual’s satisfaction depends mainly on
expectations, formed through comparisons. In order to analyze reported satisfac-
tion, therefore, the reference group should be known and taken into consideration.
Here, we will analyze diﬀerences in satisfaction, reported by household partners.
It seems reasonable to assume that the partners evaluate their household income
in consideration of the same reference group. What is more, I assume that part-
ners form their expectations about welfare-eﬀective income with reference to each
other. More precisely, I assume that partners expect equal sharing in the sense
of equal welfare levels uih(.) from the household income. This assumption is nec-
essary because we could otherwise only detect deviations from expected shares
of income and not deviations from equal sharing. In the cultural context of
present-days Germany, characterized by individualization (Beck, 1987) and post-
materialism (Inglehart, 1997), this assumption is allowed. Meanwhile, research
into the allocation of domestic work shows that reality often falls short of such
expectations (for an overview: Peuckert, 2008).






5If partners share their household income equally and the assumption holds
that they expect equal sharing, then there is no diﬀerence between expected
and actual welfare-eﬀective income (˜ yih − y∗
ih). The term turns positive if actual
welfare-eﬀective income is higher than expected, and is negative otherwise.




    
    
> 0 more than expected,
= 0 as much as expected,
< 0 less than expected.
Receiving more than expected should have a positive eﬀect on ﬁnancial satis-
faction. Financial satisfaction can therefore be explained as being dependent on
the diﬀerence between actual and expected welfare eﬀective income:
sih = αi + x
′
ihβi + δ(˜ yih − y
∗
ih) + εih (5)
where:
sih = individual ﬁnancial satisfaction
αi = gender-speciﬁc regression constant
xih = vector with individual characteristics
βi = vector with gender-speciﬁc eﬀects
δ = eﬀect of intra-household sharing on ﬁnancial satisfaction
εih = individual error term
Model (5) alone is insuﬃcient to analyze the distribution of income-induced
well-being among household partners. Rather, income sharing can be examined
by comparing the partners’ ﬁnancial satisfaction.
If partners shared their income equally, they should ceteris paribus be equally
satisﬁed. If one partner controls more income than the expected amount, he or
she should report more ﬁnancial satisfaction than his/her partner, given their
endowment with other relevant attributes. It is the diﬀerence in reported satis-
faction that provides information about the sharing of income among partners.
For this reason, Eq. (5) for the female partner is subtracted from Eq. (5) for the
male partner:
∆sh =smh − sfh




fhβf + δ(˜ ymh − y
∗
mh − ˜ yfh + y
∗
fh) + υh (6)
6where:
υh = εmh − εfh = household level error term
Regarding the diﬀerences in reported satisfaction, the term containing the
within-household distribution of income is positive if the couple shares its income
in favor of the man; it equals zero if they share equally, and negative if they share
in favor of the woman.
(˜ ymh − y
∗




    
    
> 0 Sharing in favor of the man
= 0 Equal Sharing, i.e. (˜ yih = y∗
ih)
< 0 Sharing in favor of the woman
Even after identifying the sharing of income among partners as inﬂuencing the
partners’ ﬁnancial satisfaction, it still remains unobservable - but theory will pro-
vide assistance. Income sharing can be seen as determined by bargaining power,
and it seems plausible to assume that the more powerful partner inﬂuences ﬁ-
nancial decisions such as to maximize his/her individual well-being. Again, this
bargaining power itself is unobservable, but endogenous. It may be explained as
compensation for contributions to the household’s welfare (cf. Blood and Wolfe,
1960), or with the amount of welfare each partner would lose in case of disagree-
ment (cf. Ott, 1992; Lundberg and Pollak, 1996).
These two approaches lead to similar expectations: the partner who gains
more from the partnership is the one who is worse oﬀ in the event of disagreement.
In order to determine who is better or worse oﬀ in a partnership, the partners’
endowment with means of power is analyzed. Particular hypotheses depend on
the assumptions about the threat point, i.e. the consequence of disagreement,
which will be discussed in Section 4.
For the analysis at hand, age, years of education and own income (earned in-
come plus transfers, as far as they are individually assignable) are taken as means
of power, zih. The distribution of these means of power is supposed to determine
the sharing of income between household partners. Without much doubt, sharing






. Within-household sharing of income is supposed to be
some function e(.) of the distribution factors displayed in vector dh.
7Formally:
(˜ ymh − y
∗
mh − ˜ yfh + y
∗
fh) = e(dh) (7)
and
dh = [diag(zmh + zfh)
−1]zmh (8)
where:
dh = vector of distribution factors
zmh = vector of the male partner’s characteristics, taken as means of power
zfh = vector of the female partner’s characteristics, taken as means of power
By combining Eq. (6) and (7), we obtain the model for the following estima-
tions.






hγ + υh (9)
where:
γ = vector containing the eﬀects distribution factors exert on the satisfaction diﬀerence
Fig. 1 roughly outlines the underlying relation between theoretical issues and
observable facts, in order to facilitate understanding of the model.
Figure 1: Overview
The model will show whether couples share their household income equally or
depending on one or more distribution factors. If distribution factors signiﬁcantly
8inﬂuence the satisfaction diﬀerences, the equal sharing hypothesis can be rejected.
Further, the signiﬁcant and insigniﬁcant distribution factors provide indications
of the procedure of distribution.
3 Data and empirical speciﬁcation
This analysis uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)2 re-
trieved using the PanelWhiz tool3. The SOEP is a longitudinal survey of persons
in households in the Federal Republic of Germany, run annually by the DIW in
Berlin. It covers micro-data about demographic, economic, social and political
topics, including a wide range of questions on subjective well-being.
The within-household distribution of income is relevant only in households of
two or more individuals, so that this analysis focuses on couples living together,
with or without children. Couples living together with other persons apart from
their own children are excluded. Also, households are dropped when one of the
partners leaves the household. All observations with missing values are deleted.
Using the waves 1999 up to 2008, an unbalanced sample of n = 5842 couples
(
 n
i=1 ti = 22686 observations) is obtained.
To determine the distribution of income among household partners, the part-
ners diﬀerence in ﬁnancial satisfaction, men minus women, ranging from -10 up
to 10, is used as the dependent variable. In the SOEP, ﬁnancial satisfaction is
surveyed at the beginning of the questionnaire with the following question:
‘How satisﬁed are you today with the following areas of your life?
Please answer by using the following scale: 0 means "totally unhappy",
10 means "totally happy".
How satisﬁed are you with your household income?’
Satisfaction diﬀerences are not a usual dependent variable, which is why a
spike plot is presented. Fig. 2 shows the distribution of the dependent variable,
2The data used in this publication were made available by the German Socio-Economic Panel
Study (SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin. For details, see
Wagner et al. (2007); Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2005).
3The data used in this paper were extracted using the add-on package PanelWhiz v3.0 (Nov
2010) for Stata. PanelWhiz was written by John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu). The
PanelWhiz generated .do ﬁles and plugins to retrieve the SOEP data used here are available
on request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are my own. Haisken-DeNew and
Hahn (2006) describe PanelWhiz in detail.
9the diﬀerence in ﬁnancial satisfaction between husband and wife and, for compar-
ison, the normal distribution. The generally small satisfaction diﬀerence between
husband and wife is not surprising with regard to the ﬁndings of Van Praag and
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004). They also found small diﬀerences in ﬁnancial satisfac-
tion and its determinants between women and men in Germany (Van Praag and
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004, 117). The slight tendency towards the left end of the
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Figure 2: Diﬀerences in expressed ﬁnancial satisfaction
The satisfaction diﬀerences are to be explained in order to test the equal
sharing hypothesis and to gain insight into the procedure of distribution between
household partners. Explanatory variables are the distribution factors, following
the structure described in Eq. (8). That is: values of 0.5 indicate that both
partners are equally endowed with the respective attribute; values between zero
and 0.5 indicate that the man’s endowment is less than that of his spouse; values
between 0.5 and unity indicate that the man’s endowment exceeds that of his
spouse. Three distribution factors will be analyzed:
1. The relation between the partners’ individual income (gross wage plus in-
comes from any other source, where given in gross amounts, all in log val-
ues), ranging from 0 (man having no income) to 1 (man having all income),
2. the relation between the partners’ age, ranging from 0.36 to 0.7, and
103. the relation between the partners’ education or earnings potential (including
vocational training, expressed in years necessary to obtain such certiﬁcate)
ranging from 0.28 to 0.72.
Further, the model contains independent variables to control for the partners’
diﬀerent endowment with characteristics, inﬂuencing satisfaction statements.
Kalugina et al. (2009) used a diﬀerent approach to adjust self-reported welfare to
deviances from experienced welfare: they allowed small diﬀerences of self-reported
welfare in their deﬁnition of equal sharing. In addition to the within-household
sharing there are further attributes that are related to ﬁnancial satisfaction (cf.
Argyle, 1999; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004): age, education, income
and employment. To conﬁrm these attributes, random eﬀect estimations4 are
run on the same sample, separated by gender, i.e. for each partner of a couple,
according to the following model:
siht = αi + x
′
ihtβi + νih + τiht (10)
where:
νih = individual random eﬀect
τiht = residual error term
Robust clustered standard errors are assumed for these estimations because
errors τiht are neither identically nor independently distributed. The results are
shown in Table 1.
Based on the results in Table 1, in the subsequent estimations the follow-
ing variables will be used to control for the partners’ diﬀerent endowments with
satisfaction-inﬂuencing characteristics: each partner’s own income (for some es-
timations, this will be separated according to sources of income, i.e. earned
4As usual, when the sample size is big, and the Hausman test therefore is powerful (cf.
Meepagala, 1992), ﬁxed eﬀects estimations are indicated. The analyses in this paper, however,
do not employ ﬁxed eﬀects estimation due to its ineﬃciency and the loss of cross-sectional
information. This is of importance here, because ﬁve out of six explaining variables show
remarkably lower within- than between-variation. As a consequence, some of the standard
errors estimated with ﬁxed eﬀects models are suspiciously high. Beyond this, Hahn et al.
(2010) showed that the preconditions for the Hausman test may be violated if within variation
is small, and therefore the test may be unreliable. Finally, the results do not change in a
theoretically meaningful way.
11Table 1: Determinants of ﬁnancial satisfaction
Men Women
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Household income, log. 1.326*** (0.044) 1.575*** (0.043)
Household size, log. -0.549*** (0.101) -0.449*** (0.104)
Age -0.005 (0.017) -0.006 (0.018)
Age, squared -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Birth cohort: before 1950 0.213 (0.136) -0.145 (0.141)
Birth cohort: 1951 - 1970 -0.041 (0.088) -0.137 (0.085)
Years of education 0.043*** (0.007) 0.040*** (0.008)
Earned income 0.299*** (0.021) 0.098*** (0.018)
Transfer income 0.041* (0.022) -0.025** (0.012)
Old age pension 0.030* (0.015) 0.003 (0.022)
Working hours -0.000 (0.001) -0.009*** (0.001)
Unemployed -0.644*** (0.184) -0.459*** (0.125)
Control for hh heterogeneity yes yes
Period eﬀect control yes yes
Constant -6.759*** (0.459) -6.894*** (0.457)
Note: Linear regression estimations with individual-speciﬁc random eﬀects. Clustered robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance level: *<0.1, *<0.05, ***<0.01. Reference
category: Birth cohort: after 1970. Complete estimation results can be found in the Appendix
in Table A.1.
Source: SOEP 1999 - 2008.
 n
i=1 ti = 22686.
income, own pension, other individual transfer income), years of education (as
deﬁned above), actual working hours and a dummy variable indicating whether
someone is unemployed at the time of the interview.
The systematic control for attributes that aﬀect satisfaction in addition to
perceived welfare distinguishes this analysis from other work using a subjective
approach (Bonke and Browning, 2009; Kalugina et al., 2009). Since most partners
diﬀer with regard to such attributes, unequal answers to questions of satisfaction
do not necessarily express unequal welfare. For this reason, it is necessary to
control for these attributes in order to examine the distribution of welfare be-
tween household partners, instead of the distribution of answers on questions of
satisfaction.
To control for the household’s stratum, the school-leaving certiﬁcate of the
better educated partner and the combined birth cohort of the partners are used.
For this sample, I expect that scarcity evokes unequal sharing in favor of the
more powerful partner. The household’s income is therefore included in log val-
ues as a control variable. Ludwig-Mayerhofer et al. (2006) found that inequality
between household partners occurs more frequently when household income is
12higher. However, their results do not shape expectations in this case because
they examined inequality in poor households and focused on amounts of spend-
ing money, not welfare. Again, the household income is adjusted to household
size using the number of persons in log values (cf. Schwarze, 2003). Further het-
erogeneity is controlled for by family situation (childless couples, couples with
children of both spouses in household, couples with children from only one of the
spouses, couples with children of both spouses that live in other households), the
employment situation of the household (one binary variable indicating whether
both spouses have the same employment level, another indicating whether al-
location of work follows the male breadwinner scheme), the legal status of the
partnership, i.e. married (yes or no), and whether the partners grew up in the
GDR or immigrated to Germany after 1949). Date eﬀects are controlled for by
including year dummies.
4 Estimation and results
One major advantage of this analysis compared to other work on this topic (Bonke
and Browning, 2009; Kalugina et al., 2009) is the usage of panel data. In con-
trast, Bonke and Browning (2009) explicitly refrain from using within-household
variation over time. Instead, they used only the ﬁrst wave of their panel data set,
asserting that they "ﬁnd it unlikely that transitory changes in the distribution of
within-household income would lead to signiﬁcant contemporaneous changes of
private expenditures" (Bonke and Browning, 2009, p.35). Using panel data allows
us to control for unobserved household heterogeneity, such as the particular con-
stellation of individual psychological characteristics. It is well known that these
stable individual characteristics have a large impact on responses to satisfaction
items (Argyle, 1999; Diener et al., 1999). This means that an optimist and a
pessimist will express diverging satisfaction regarding the same level of welfare,
everything else held constant. The diﬀerence in self-reported satisfaction there-
fore depends on the particular constellation of characters of each couple. This is
what is called unobserved household heterogeneity, which needs to be controlled
for in order to examine the distribution of income-induced well-being.
Using random eﬀects estimation, the household-speciﬁc error term ηh in Eq. (11)
accounts for this. Adding the time dimension, the estimated model can be written
as






htγ + ηh + εht. (11)
Stochastic errors are kept in εht, and the intercept β0 = αm −αf contains the
gender eﬀect on ﬁnancial satisfaction.
Responses to satisfaction items are usually used as data on an ordinal scale
of measurement. The same could have be expected with satisfaction diﬀerences.
Other authors proceeded in that way (Bonke and Browning, 2009; Kalugina et al.,
2009), collapsing the diﬀerences to broader categories and then using ordered
probit estimation. But once diﬀerences between scores of expressed satisfaction
are used, a metric scale is implied. Taking the diﬀerence between 1 and -1 to be
the same as the diﬀerence between 2 and 0, there is no need to imply only an
ordinal scale for these diﬀerences.
Before presenting the results , the expected impact of the distribution factors
will brieﬂy be introduced. As mentioned in Section 2, expectations depend on
assumptions about the procedure of distribution. If dissolution of the partner-
ship is assumed to be the threat point, i.e. the situation impending in case of
disagreement, then the partner with the smaller earnings potential will be worse
oﬀ. Although earnings potential may be expressed in years of education, realized
income may also be a valid and more realistic indicator of earnings potential, since
gaps in employment histories cause serious, long-lasting declines in wages (Beblo
and Wolf, 2002). If daily non-cooperation is assumed to be the consequence of
disagreement, the partner who controls the smaller share of money in the house-
hold will be worse oﬀ. Thus, the eﬀect will be the same for both distribution
procedures: the partner with the smaller income share will be worse oﬀ in the
event of disagreement and will therefore be more likely to back down in bargain-
ing situations. The satisfaction diﬀerence (computed as the man’s satisfaction
minus the woman’s) will ceteris paribus be smaller when the man’s income share
is smaller. The same can be expected following the resource theory of power.
The more a partner contributes to the welfare of the other household members,
the more often she or he can decide on matters concerning the household. The
more income they contribute, the more often they can decide how to spend it
Consequently, their welfare will be higher than the respective partner’s welfare.
Relative age may inﬂuence the distribution of power in a partnership if dis-
solution looms because age inﬂuences chances on the marriage market - by and
large in favor of the younger person, as Lankuttis and Blossfeld (2003) showed
14for remarriages. If the distribution of power can be explained by contributions
to the household’s welfare and age can be interpreted as experience, and hence
the ability to enhance the household’s welfare, the older partner should be bet-
ter oﬀ in bargaining situations. It is also plausible to assume, however, that the
younger partner contributes to the well-being of the other due to the value society
attaches to youthfulness. If daily non-cooperation is assumed to be the threat
point, relative age should not have any inﬂuence on the distribution of income.
Relative education is expected to have a positive eﬀect on the income distri-
bution if it is understood as earnings potential and if dissolution is assumed to
be the threat point. The same is to be expected if education represents contri-
butions to the household’s well-being and bargaining power is understood as a
compensation for that. If daily non-cooperation marks the threat point, educa-
tion should not have any inﬂuence on income distribution because education does
not determine control over resources, i.e. income in household.
If none of the distribution factors have a statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on satisfaction diﬀerences, the equal sharing hypothesis, i.e. that spouses share
their household income equally in the sense of equal welfare, would hold. If one or
more of the distribution factors aﬀect satisfaction diﬀerences, the equal sharing
hypothesis would be rejected.
Eq. (11) was estimated assuming random eﬀects and robust, clustered residual
error terms because of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. First, the model
was estimated using the very three explaining variables introduced in Section 3.
Model 1 in Table 2 shows that only one of the theoretically interesting variables
explains satisfaction diﬀerences between household partners. The relation of ﬁ-
nancial contributions to the household’s income has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
on the diﬀerence in ﬁnancial satisfaction, even though diﬀerence in own income
is controlled for. It would not be possible to interpret the eﬀect size in terms
of welfare-eﬀective incomes without extensive assumptions on the individual’s
welfare function of income. This will not be performed here; the statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect is used to show that sharing is not independent, and therefore
cannot follow an equal sharing rule. It also shows that the satisfaction diﬀer-
ence is larger, when the man contributes more to the household income than
his wife. That means, the more a partner contributes to the household income,
the more the partner beneﬁts from it. Neither relation of education nor relation
of age explains diﬀerences in satisfaction. Virtually none of the household-level
15Table 2: Determinants of diﬀerences in ﬁnancial satisfaction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Age relation -0.691 (0.676) -0.570 (0.681) -0.578 (0.674)
Income relation 1.254*** (0.239)
Relation earned income 1.084*** (0.232) 1.034*** (0.222)
Relation pension 1.063** (0.528) 1.011** (0.512)
Relation transfer income -0.417 (0.466) -0.098 (0.083)
Education relation 3.509 (2.398) 3.455 (2.400) 3.603 (2.382)
Husband’s years of education -0.069 (0.046) -0.068 (0.046) -0.080* (0.045)
Wife’s years of education 0.083* (0.045) 0.082* (0.046) 0.080* (0.045)
Husband’s income -0.062 (0.044)
Wife’s income 0.116*** (0.031)
Husband’s earned income -0.038 (0.040) -0.060* (0.035)
Wife’s earned income 0.081*** (0.030) 0.070** (0.029)
Husband’s old age pension -0.001 (0.017)
Wife’s old age pension 0.152** (0.065) 0.146** (0.062)
Husband’s transfer income 0.027 (0.031)
Wife’s transfer income -0.058 (0.079)
Husband’s working hours -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
Wife’s weekly working hours 0.005*** (0.002) 0.005*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002)
Husband unemployed -0.237 (0.236) -0.241 (0.252)
Wife unemployed 0.124 (0.167) 0.084 (0.171)
Household income, log. -0.071 (0.054) -0.064 (0.053)
Household size, log. -0.066 (0.100) -0.070 (0.100)
Control for hh heterogeneity yes yes no
Period eﬀect control yes yes partially
Constant -2.194 (1.351) -2.776* (1.534) -3.427** (1.393)
Note: Linear regression estimations with household-speciﬁc random eﬀects. Clustered robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance level: *<0.1, *<0.05, ***<0.01. Complete
estimation results can be found in the Appendix in Table A.2.
Source: SOEP 1999 - 2008.
 n
i=1 ti = 22686. n = 5842.
16control variables are signiﬁcantly related to satisfaction diﬀerences. This may be
surprising, but it is in line with the ﬁndings of Bonke and Browning (2009).
The inﬂuence of various sources of income on satisfaction diﬀerences is an-
alyzed in a second step, since several considerations lead to the expectation of
diﬀerent eﬀects for the various sources of income. For example, Oswald and
Winkelmann (2008) showed that diﬀerent sources of income have distinct eﬀects
on satisfaction. In light of the brieﬂy discussed theories above, distinct eﬀects
of diﬀerent sources of income may be interpreted as an indication of one or the
other distribution procedure. If the amount of income a partner controls were
the distribution factor, as bargaining theory with the threat point of daily non-
cooperation supposes, all sources of income should exert nearly the same inﬂuence
on satisfaction diﬀerences. Likewise, bargaining with the threat of the dissolu-
tion of the partnership would predict nearly the same eﬀects for all sources of
income because the individually assignable transfer income does not depend on
the structure and needs of the household. According to the ﬁndings of Oswald and
Winkelmann (2008), we could expect income of diﬀerent sources to be perceived
unequally as individual contribution to the welfare of the household members.
If this is the case, with the resource theory of power we could expect income
from diﬀerent sources to be compensated unequally with rights to decide how to
spend the income. The eﬀects of income from diﬀerent sources on satisfaction
diﬀerences would diﬀer: the earned income would have the largest eﬀect and
transfer income the smallest, because the latter ﬂows without eﬀort. The eﬀect
of own pensions would be somewhere in between, because retirement income also
comes without further eﬀort, but is strongly dependent on former contributions.
Model 2 in Table 2 therefore includes diﬀerent sources of income: instead of the
distribution factor ‘income relation’, three distribution factors are included: ‘re-
lation of earned income’, ‘relation of old age pensions’ and ‘relation of transfer
income’. Following the idea to control for satisfaction-inﬂuencing attributes, the
control variables are adjusted to the explaining variables, i.e. separated in the
same categories. The results clearly show that transfer income does not act as a
means of power, the coeﬃcient of ‘relation of transfer income’ is not systemati-
cally diﬀerent from zero. Only earned income and pensions, which are strongly
related to former earnings, have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on diﬀerences in
ﬁnancial satisfaction between household partners and, hence, can be interpreted
as inﬂuencing the within-household sharing of income.
17Since many of the covariates do not exert any signiﬁcant inﬂuence on satisfac-
tion diﬀerences, for a third estimation (Model 3 in Table 2) insigniﬁcant variables
were dropped stepwise to reach a more parsimonious speciﬁcation. The eﬀects
of the signiﬁcant distribution factors diminish slightly, but as the size of these
eﬀects is not interpretable, the main result is stable despite this change. Further-
more, the eﬀects of the husband’s years of education and the husband’s earned
income approximate the respective eﬀect of the wife’s and become statistically
signiﬁcant. The standard errors of the explanatory variable ‘education relation’
are rather high. This could be caused by collinearity with the control variables
‘years of education’ of both partners, leading to the imprecise estimation of the
coeﬃcients (cf. Greene, 2008). For this reason, a further estimation was run
without these covariates (results not shown); standard errors decreased and the
coeﬃcient changed, but remained insigniﬁcant. Other coeﬃcients did not change
substantially.
The estimation results provide an indication of distribution factors or means of
power: partners share their household income according to their contributions to
this income. This ﬁnding is not adequate to discriminate between one or the other
procedure of distribution - all three theories predicted this result. The results of
the second estimation, which distinguishes between diﬀerent sources of income,
are contrary to both bargaining theories. They are in line with the resource
theory of power, which explains decision rights as compensation for individual
contributions to the other’s welfare. If the results of Oswald and Winkelmann
(2008) are interpreted liberally, transfer income might be perceived as individually
assignable contribution that does not need to be compensated because of the less
eﬀort required to obtain it. Further research into the meanings of income from
diﬀerent sources will help to assess this interpretation.
The results do not support any unambiguous statement about distribution
procedures, but in sum provide evidence against the equal sharing assumption.
This is in line with other work on this topic (Bonke and Browning, 2009; Ludwig-
Mayerhofer et al., 2006; Kalugina et al., 2009; Browning et al., 1994; Bourguignon
et al., 1993).
185 Simulation
The results shown in Section 4 imply that equivalent income calculated under the
assumption of equal sharing does not represent the individual’s welfare position.
Further, the results indicate that income sharing between household partners
depends on each partner’s contributions to the household income. However, the
results do not allow statements to be made about how unequal partners share
their income. This would require further speciﬁcations of the utility function, i.e.
on the transmission from income to welfare.
To outline the possible scope of misrepresentation, a straightforward simula-
tion is executed. The spouses mean welfare-eﬀective income is calculated based
on assumptions of dependent sharing. To enable interpretation to be made,
equivalent income, computed under the assumption of equal sharing, will also
be displayed.
In the illustrative simulation it is therefore assumed that partners share parts
of their income corresponding to their income contribution, i.e. the within-
household economies of scale are unequally shared. Other assumptions are pos-
sible, too (cf. Phipps and Burton, 1995; Jenkins, 1991). For this simulation, an
equivalence scale with an elasticity of e=0.3 is used to adjust the monthly house-
hold net income yh for economies of scale5. Instead of assigning every household
partner the same welfare eﬀective income ˜ yih, however, the adjusted household
income is allocated according to the following sharing rule:
nh denotes the household size (number of persons) and ph is the income share
the husband contributes to the household’s income, i.e. one of the elements of
the vector of distribution factors dh, explained in Section 3.














5Equivalence scales can be compared regarding their elasticity (Buhmann et al., 1988). The
higher the elasticity, the lower the assumed economies of scale. The OECD equivalence scale,
for example, can be approximated with an elasticity of 0.5. Due to the assumptions made
here to compute the welfare-eﬀective income under dependent sharing, the diﬀerence between
the husbands’ and the wives’ mean income will be smaller when equivalence scales with higher
elasticity are used.













(1 − ph). (13)
Using these welfare eﬀective incomes, the mean incomes of husbands and wives
in the sample at hand were computed. It should be kept in mind that the precise
assumption about the extent of dependent sharing is not an estimation result but
a somehow arbitrary setting. Estimation results only allow us to state that the
more income a partner contributes, the more she or he gets out of the household
income. Table 3 shows the mean and the standard deviation of the monthly
welfare-eﬀective income for male and female household partners, computed under
the assumption of equal sharing and under the assumption of dependent sharing,
as outlined above.
Table 3: Personal welfare-eﬀective monthly income in Euro in 2008 computed
under diﬀerent assumptions
Husbands Wives
Computed under equal sharing assumption
Mean 2409.78 2409.78
Standard deviation 1086.94 1086.94
Computed under dependent sharing assumption
Mean 2848.72 1970.83
Standard deviation 1418.57 1001.08
Note: Observations are frequency-weighted using household weights. Source: SOEP 2008,
n = 2093 couples, N = 4669688 households.
Under the assumption of equal sharing, the mean incomes of household part-
ners are the same. However, under the assumption of dependent sharing as de-
ﬁned above, husbands’ mean income is nearly 50 percent higher than wives’ mean
income. This holds for the whole distribution of personal income. Fig. 3 shows
the kernel density estimation for the distribution of personal income, computed
under the equal sharing assumption, and the respective estimations for the distri-
bution of income, computed under the dependent sharing assumption, separated
by gender.
This may serve as an illustration of the possible magnitude of misrepresen-
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Figure 3: Distributions of personal income computed under diﬀerent assumptions
6 Concluding remarks
In this analysis, components of diﬀerences in ﬁnancial satisfaction between house-
hold partners are interpreted as welfare diﬀerences. The well-being from the
household’s income should be equally distributed among household members if
they shared their household income following an equal sharing rule.
The results clearly show that the equal sharing hypothesis can be rejected.
The estimated eﬀects of the distribution factors are stable for diﬀerent vectors of
control variables. Observable household heterogeneity did not have statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects on the satisfaction diﬀerences. Neither the legal status of the
partnership nor the presence of children or the amount of the household’s income
itself determine intra-household sharing.
Adding to the literature, a theoretical model was developed that allows us to
distinguish between 1) variables explaining welfare diﬀerences between household
partners, and 2) variables required to control for the household partners’ diﬀerent
endowment with satisfaction-inﬂuencing attributes. Another novelty is the use
of panel data so that random eﬀects estimation could be employed, enabling
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
For all analyses of the personal income distribution, these results imply that
equivalent income, computed under the assumption of equal sharing, will lead to
misrepresentation of the welfare position, ascribed to most persons in households
of two or more individuals.
21A Appendix
Table A.1: Determinants of ﬁnancial satisfaction
Men Women
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Household income, log. 1.325*** (0.044) 1.573*** (0.043)
Household size, log. -0.550*** (0.101) -0.444*** (0.104)
Current age -0.005 (0.017) -0.006 (0.018)
Current age, squared -0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Birth cohort: before 1950 0.212 (0.136) -0.145 (0.141)
Birth cohort: 1951 - 1970 -0.042 (0.088) -0.136 (0.085)
Years of education 0.043*** (0.007) 0.040*** (0.008)
Earned income 0.299*** (0.021) 0.098*** (0.018)
Transfer income 0.041* (0.022) -0.025** (0.012)
Old age pension 0.030* (0.015) 0.003 (0.022)
Working hours -0.000 (0.001) -0.009*** (0.001)
Unemployed -0.644*** (0.184) -0.460*** (0.125)
Male breadwinner household -0.201*** (0.064) -0.048 (0.066)
Equal employment level -0.016 (0.025) 0.011 (0.028)
Married 0.118** (0.048) 0.175*** (0.049)
Childless -0.018 (0.077) 0.077 (0.078)
Children in hh, not shared -0.147** (0.058) -0.088 (0.059)
Children out of hh -0.047 (0.072) 0.098 (0.074)
Changing family situation 0.004 (0.057) -0.037 (0.058)
East German origin -0.371*** (0.049) -0.424*** (0.050)
Immigrated -0.088 (0.064) -0.142** (0.065)
d2000 -0.006 (0.043) 0.100** (0.044)
d2001 0.071 (0.044) 0.072 (0.045)
d2002 0.971*** (0.050) 0.994*** (0.052)
d2003 0.851*** (0.052) 0.770*** (0.053)
d2004 0.715*** (0.053) 0.727*** (0.055)
d2005 0.724*** (0.055) 0.708*** (0.057)
d2006 0.700*** (0.057) 0.664*** (0.058)
d2007 0.643*** (0.059) 0.622*** (0.060)
d2008 0.672*** (0.062) 0.612*** (0.063)
Constant -6.756*** (0.458) -6.882*** (0.456)
Note: Linear regression models with individual speciﬁc random eﬀects. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Signiﬁcance level: *<0.1, *<0.05, ***<0.01. Reference category: Birth cohort:
after 1970.
Source: SOEP 1999 - 2008.
 n
i=1 ti = 22862.
22Table A.2: Determinants of diﬀerences in ﬁnancial satisfaction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Age relation -0.691 (0.676) -0.570 (0.681) -0.578 (0.674)
Income relation 1.254*** (0.239)
Relation earned income 1.084*** (0.232) 1.034*** (0.222)
Relation pension 1.063** (0.528) 1.011** (0.512)
Relation transfer income -0.417 (0.466) -0.098 (0.083)
Education relation 3.509 (2.400) 3.455 (2.402) 3.603 (2.383)
Husband’s years of education -0.069 (0.046) -0.068 (0.046) -0.080* (0.045)
Wife’s years of education 0.083* (0.045) 0.082* (0.046) 0.080* (0.045)
Husband’s income -0.062 (0.044)
Wife’s income 0.116*** (0.031)
Husband’s earned income -0.038 (0.040) -0.060* (0.035)
Wife’s earned income 0.081*** (0.030) 0.070** (0.029)
Husband’s old age pension -0.001 (0.017)
Wife’s old age pension 0.152** (0.065) 0.146** (0.062)
Husband’s transfer income 0.027 (0.031)
Wife’s transfer income -0.058 (0.079)
Husband’s weekly working
hours
-0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
Wife’s weekly working hours 0.005*** (0.002) 0.005*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002)
Husband unemployed -0.237 (0.236) -0.241 (0.252)
Wife unemployed 0.124 (0.167) 0.084 (0.171)
Household income, log. -0.071 (0.054) -0.064 (0.053)
Household size, log. -0.066 (0.100) -0.070 (0.100)
Birth cohort: before 1950 0.009 (0.069) 0.022 (0.070)
Birth cohort: 1951 - 1970 -0.008 (0.054) 0.002 (0.054)
At most, basic school leaving
certiﬁcate
-0.039 (0.051) -0.037 (0.051)
University degree -0.068 (0.057) -0.068 (0.058)
Male breadwinner household -0.047 (0.080) -0.064 (0.080)
Spouses with equal
employment level
-0.000 (0.032) -0.004 (0.032)
Married -0.075 (0.052) -0.067 (0.052)
Childless, equal empl.level -0.028 (0.073) -0.030 (0.073)
Children in hh, not shared -0.030 (0.053) -0.036 (0.053)
Children out of hh, and
other childless
-0.100 (0.077) -0.098 (0.077)
Changing hh situation 0.047 (0.049) 0.047 (0.049)
One spouse grew up in GDR -0.087 (0.117) -0.083 (0.117)
Both grew up in GDR 0.055 (0.046) 0.051 (0.046)
Both spouses immigrated 0.163*** (0.058) 0.162*** (0.058)
One spouse immigrated -0.120 (0.085) -0.117 (0.085)
d2000 -0.114** (0.049) -0.112** (0.049) -0.106*** (0.036)
d2001 -0.026 (0.050) -0.025 (0.050)
d2002 -0.034 (0.055) -0.037 (0.056)
d2003 0.055 (0.057) 0.054 (0.057)
d2004 -0.049 (0.056) -0.050 (0.057)
d2005 -0.033 (0.057) -0.033 (0.057)
23Table A.2: (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
d2006 -0.022 (0.058) -0.023 (0.058)
d2007 -0.044 (0.057) -0.044 (0.058)
d2008 -0.019 (0.057) -0.019 (0.058)
Constant -2.194 (1.351) -2.776* (1.534) -3.427** (1.393)
Note: Linear regression models with household-speciﬁc random eﬀects. Clustered robust
standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance level: *<0.1, *<0.05, ***<0.01. Reference
categories: Birth cohort: after 1970; Intermediate education; Spouses with intermediate
unequal employment level and female breadwinner households; Couple living together with at
least one joint child.
Source: SOEP 1999 - 2008.
 n
i=1 ti = 22862. n = 5915.
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